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Abstract
In 2009, influenza A H1N1 caused the first pandemic of the 21
st century. Although a vaccine
against this influenza subtype was offered before or at the onset of the second epidemic
wave that caused most of the fatal cases in Europe, vaccination rates for that season were
lower than expected. We propose that the contradiction between high risk of infection and
low use of available prevention measures represents a pandemic public health paradox.
This research aims for a better understanding of this paradox by exploring the time-depen-
dent interplay among changing influenza epidemiology, media attention, pandemic control
measures, risk perception and public health behavior among five European countries
(Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Spain and the UK). Findings suggest that asynchro-
nicity between media curves and epidemiological curves may potentially explain the pan-
demic public health paradox; media attention for influenza A H1N1 in Europe declined long
before the epidemic reached its peak, and public risk perceptions and behaviors may have
followed media logic, rather than epidemiological logic.
Introduction
In 2009, a new influenza A/H1N1 virus emerged causing the first pandemic of the 21
st century.
The pandemic virus was first reported fromMexico on 4 April 2009, and spread rapidly across
the globe [1]. Already on 27 April, the first laboratory confirmed cases were reported in
Europe. A spring wave of transmission eventually followed by an autumn wave affected all EU
countries [2–3]. Although a vaccine against this influenza subtype was offered in most of the
European countries before, or at the onset of, the second epidemic wave that caused most of
the fatal cases in Europe, vaccination rates were lower than expected, as a large proportion of
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citizens did not follow vaccination recommendations [4]. In some European countries vaccina-
tion rates against pandemic influenza were even lower than in previous years against seasonal
influenza, even though the risk of infection in 2009 and 2010 was higher than during a normal
influenza season. We propose that the contradiction between higher risk of infection and lower
use of available prevention measures such as vaccination during the influenza A H1N1 pan-
demic represents a pandemic public health paradox.
The present research approaches the influenza A H1N1 pandemic from an interdisciplinary
perspective in order to shed more light on this pandemic public health paradox. Building on
theory and findings from epidemiology, communication science, and risk perception, this
study examines the time-dependent interplay of the number of influenza A H1N1 cases, influ-
enza A H1N1 casualties, media reports, pandemic control measures, risk perception and public
health behavior across five European countries: Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Spain
and the UK. Gaining convergent evidence across countries with different public health systems,
media systems, and cultures is important to increase our understanding of generalizable pat-
terns in epidemiology, media responses, and public responses, and the ways in which these pat-
terns may interact.
Previous research has shown that influenza rates sometimes converge with (social) media
patterns, but often times do not [5–7]. This lack of convergence may be explained by the fact
that media logic does not equate epidemiological logic; for example, the first casualty in an epi-
demic has higher news value than later casualties, and influenza cases occurring close by have
higher news value than cases occurring in a faraway country. News media can shape public per-
ceptions in different ways, through (a) the sheer number of news reported in a specific time
frame, (b) the content of media messages, and (c) the tone of coverage [8]. With regard to the
content of media coverage of influenza A H1N1, evidence from existing media analyses indi-
cates that information on the severity of and vulnerability to the influenza A H1N1 virus was
the predominant theme in news reporting, followed by information of preventive measures
(response efficacy) [9–13]. Tone of coverage was only examined by few studies. Most studies
found little indication for alarmist, or dramatic reporting. For example, Duncan (2009)
reported that 70% of articles published in European media during the first pandemic week
were factual [14]. Hilton and Hunt (2011) likewise reported that the majority (83%) of articles
over the further course of the pandemic had a factual, or neutral, tone [12]. In contrast, Vaster-
man and Ruigrok (2013) report that 74% of messages in The Netherlands contained alarming
frames [15].
In the present research, we extend previous studies by zooming in on the amount of media
coverage across different European countries during the entire influenza A H1N1 time span.
Examining sheer media attention is important, as it determines not only what the public is pre-
occupied with (agenda-setting function of media), it can also be a contributing factor to the
social amplification–or attenuation—of risk [16–20], affecting risk perceptions and public
behaviors. To date fairly little empirical evidence exists on this topic, except for the Netherlands
[15], the UK [12], and the first week after the outbreak [14]. A review on worldwide news cov-
erage of the influenza A H1N1 pandemic demonstrated that while media attention was large, it
did not parallel epidemiological developments but rather was triggered mostly by key real-
world events [8]. Findings across media analyses indicate that the volume of news coverage of
the influenza A H1N1 pandemic was by far the highest at the very start of the pandemic but
rapidly waned thereafter [11–15, 21], at trend that was similarly was found for online media [7,
22]. Other news peaks coincided with the official pandemic declaration on 11 June 2009 and a
first wave of influenza A H1N1 cases, the start of a mass vaccination program, and an autumn
wave of infections around October 2009 [11–12, 15, 22–23].
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Because media attention may be related to public perceptions and behaviors, more so than
epidemiological numbers [5], asynchronous media and epidemiological patterns may be one
potential explanation for paradoxical public responses during epidemic outbreaks. The aim of
the present research is to investigate explanations for the influenza A H1N1 case across differ-
ent European countries. While previous research has examined, with mixed results, the rela-
tionship between actual influenza rates and (social) media attention or Google searches,
systematic and detailed cross-national comparisons of epidemiological, media and behavioral
data are still lacking.
Methods
In order to analyse the time-dependent interplay between the different pandemic progress and
control elements in five European countries—the Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Ger-
many (DE), Spain (ES) and the United Kingdom (UK)—different data sources were used.
Epidemiology and control measures
A literature search was conducted using various combinations of the search terms “H1N1”,
“epidemiology”, “population surveillance”, “prevalence“, “incidence”and “Europe” in Medline
and Google Scholar. All articles about the influenza A H1N1 pandemic in the five selected
countries published in English or German between 2009 and 2013 were included. In addition,
reference lists of the retrieved articles, grey literature and websites of national health authorities
(Robert Koch-Institute, Health Protection Agency, Spanish Ministry of Health and Social
Policy, Statens Serum Institute and the Czech Ministry of Health), and international health
agencies (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), World Health
Organization (WHO)) were searched. Data regarding the influenza A H1N1 epidemiology and
surveillance, national public health measures taken, and the official health behavior recom-
mendations given, were all retrieved for the time-period April 2009 to March 2010. For infor-
mation on the reported number of influenza A H1N1 related deaths respective national health
authorities were contacted if the information could not be found in published literature.
Media attention
To investigate media attention between 1st April 2009 and 31rd March 2010 (1st March 2009 to
28th February 2010 for the UK), the volume of news reporting in selected print-media and TV
newscasts was measured in the five countries. For DE, ES and CZ, two opinion-leading news-
papers, a national evening newscast, and a weekly news magazine were selected (see Table 1 for
the full media set). Media attention data for these three countries were obtained from the
Table 1. Media set used to determinemedia attention in the five studied countries.
TV–Evening
Newscast
Daily serious newspaper Daily middle-market tabloid
newspaper
Daily tabloid
newspaper
Weekly
newspaper
Germany ARD Tagesschau Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Bild Spiegel
Spain TVE Telediario El Pais 20 minutos Tiempo (online)
Czech
Republic
CTV Udalosti Lidove Noviny Blesk Respekt
United
Kingdom *
- (i) The Daily Telegraph*(ii) The
Guardian*
The Daily Mail & Mail on
Sunday*
The Sun* -
Denmark - Politiken - - Politiken Weekly
*Data on the number of news articles were obtained from Hilton and Hunt; 2011 [24]
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151258.t001
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Swiss-based media research institute Media Tenor. For DK newspapers were retrieved from
the LexisNexis database for one leading daily and one weekly newspaper. Data on the number
of news articles in UK were obtained from Hilton and Hunt who published an analysis of UK
news coverage during the influenza A H1N1 pandemic using eight newspapers [24]. Four opin-
ion-leading newspapers based on category, political orientation and readership were selected
(two daily fact led newspapers, one middle-market tabloid and one daily tabloid) (see Table 1).
The news items for DE, ES and CZ were identified using the search terms “H1N1 and/or
Swine flu and/or new virus” in the respective languages in newspaper archives. All news items
were retrieved, scanned for relevance and included if they referred primarily to influenza A
H1N1, swine flu or swine flu vaccination. News stories were defined as primarily referring to
influenza A H1N1, if the topic took up either (a) the greatest part, or (b) at least half of the news
item (more than any other issue), or (c) was mentioned in the headline or (d) depicted in an
illustration. Similarly, articles in the UK and the DK newspapers were retrieved and sorted
based on the described inclusion criteria. Published letters to the editor were excluded.
Risk perception and the public’s response
To assess public risk perception and vaccine uptake as a proxy for public reaction to the pan-
demic, national surveys conducted in DE and UK were included. Further information was
obtained from the Flash Eurobarometer–Influenza A H1N1 analytical report which included 27
EU member states [25]. The national health authorities in DE, DK, and UK were contacted for
additional information on vaccine uptake.
Time series analyses were undertaken based on a series of activities: the number of con-
firmed influenza A H1N1 cases and deaths; information on key events and pandemic control
measures; vaccine uptake among the population over time, where available; and volume of
media attention during the pandemic. The dynamics and interactions of these elements were
analyzed and discussed in the context of current research.
Results
Figs 1–5 illustrate the results of the time series analysis in terms of the reported number of
cases (blue bars, scales to left Y-axis), the reported number of confirmed influenza A H1N1
deaths (red curve, scales to right Y-axis) and the number of news reports / news items pub-
lished (purple curve, scales to right Y-axis) for each country. The overall and risk-group spe-
cific vaccination coverage in August 2010 is shown in the green hexagon. The text in the
rectangular boxes describes important milestones and key events which occurred both interna-
tionally (red text) or in the respective country (black text) during the course of the pandemic.
Epidemiology
All five countries were significantly affected by two influenza A H1N1 waves–the first in spring
followed by the second, larger wave in autumn/winter 2009 [Table 2]. However, during the
course of the pandemic, some of the reporting requirements were changed. Thus, the actual
number is likely to have been higher than reflected in Figs 1–5. Nonetheless, the epidemic
curves still reflect the trends of influenza A H1N1 spread in the countries.
Surveillance
The surveillance strategies of the observed countries were changed and adapted according to
the varying epidemiology of the virus throughout the pandemic. On 16th July, the WHO
announced that countries with community-wide transmission are no longer required to
The Pandemic Public Health Paradox
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Fig 1. Epidemiology, key events andmedia attention during the A/H1N1 pandemic in Germany. Detailed data on the (i) number of new A/H1N1 cases
per week, (ii) reported number of confirmed A/H1N1 deaths, (iii) media attention and (iv) vaccination uptake are provided in ‘S1 Data’. Data on vaccination
coverage was taken fromMereckiene et al. [4] and data on risk perception from the Flash Eurobarometer survey [25]. Data on key events are provided in ‘S1
File’.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151258.g001
Fig 2. Epidemiology, key events andmedia attention during the A/H1N1 pandemic in UK.Detailed data on the (i) number of new A/H1N1 cases per
week, (ii) reported number of confirmed A/H1N1 deaths, (iii) media attention and (iv) vaccination uptake are provided in ‘S1 Data’. Data on vaccination
coverage was taken fromMereckiene et al. [4] and data on risk perception from the Flash Eurobarometer survey [25]. Data on key events are provided in ‘S1
File’.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151258.g002
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Fig 3. Epidemiology, key events andmedia attention during the A/H1N1 pandemic in Spain. Detailed data on the (i) number of new A/H1N1 cases per
week, (ii) reported number of confirmed A/H1N1 deaths and (iii) media attention are provided in ‘S1 Data’. Data on vaccination coverage was taken from
Mereckiene et al. [4] and data on risk perception from the Flash Eurobarometer survey [25]. Data on key events are provided in ‘S1 File’.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151258.g003
Fig 4. Epidemiology, key events andmedia attention during the A/H1N1 pandemic in Czech Republic. Detailed data on the (i) number of new A/H1N1
cases per week, (ii) reported number of confirmed A/H1N1 deaths and (iii) media attention are provided in the supplementary file ‘S1 Data’. Data on
vaccination coverage was taken fromMereckiene et al. [4] and data on risk perception from the Flash Eurobarometer survey [25]. Data on key events are
provided in ‘S1 File’.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151258.g004
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Table 2. Timing (calendar week in 2009) of key events related to the A/H1N1 pandemic (between April 2009 to March 2010), in the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Germany, Spain and the UK (England); pertaining to the epidemiology (cases and deaths), media attention, vaccination and risk
perception.
Country A/H1N1 cases (calendar
week in 2009)
A/H1N1
associated deaths
(calendar week in
2009)
Media attention
(calendar week in
2009)
A/H1N1 vaccination
(calendar week in 2009)
A/H1N1 –
Eurobarometer–Risk
perception survey
(conducted b/w 26th–
30th Nov 2009
1st A/H1N1
cases
1st
peak
2nd
peak
1st A/
H1N1
deaths
Peak A/
H1N1
deaths
1st
peak
2nd
peak
3rd
peak
Start of
vaccination
General
Population
coverage %
Perceived risk to get
infected %Intention to
get vaccinated %
Czech
Republic
2625.05.2009 32 47–
51
44 49 18 45 48 40 0.6% Perceived risk: 61%
unlikely Vaccination
intention:47% unlikely
Denmark 1801.05.2009 31 45–
46
46 47 & 50 18 31–
32
46 45 N.A. Perceived risk: 58%
unlikely Vaccination
intention: 60% unlikely
Germany 1829.04.2009 30–
34
46–
48
39 46–50 18 30 44–
46
44 8% Perceived risk: 69%
unlikely Vaccination
intention: 62% unlikely
Spain 1927.04.2009 29 43–
46
27 48 18 35–
36
46 40 27% Perceived risk: 49%
unlikely Vaccination
intention: 66% unlikely
United
Kingdom /
England
1827.04.2009 26–
28
43–
48
24 44–46 18 30 43–
44
43 N.A. Perceived risk: 50%
unlikely Vaccination
intention: 37% unlikely
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151258.t002
Fig 5. Epidemiology, key events andmedia attention during the A/H1N1 pandemic in Denmark.Detailed data on the (i) number of new A/H1N1 cases
per week, (ii) reported number of confirmed A/H1N1 deaths, (iii) media attention and (iv) vaccination uptake are provided in the supplementary file ‘S1 Data’.
Data on vaccination coverage was taken fromMereckiene et al. [4] and data on risk perception from the Flash Eurobarometer survey [25]. Data on key
events are provided in‘S1 File’.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151258.g005
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forward regular reports of individual confirmed cases to the WHO. This was changed as the
detection, laboratory-confirmation and investigation of all cases were extremely resource-
intensive and not sustainable [26]. Therefore, the data quality and completeness of the reported
influenza cases vary between countries and over time.
Pandemic control measures
Initially DE, DK, ES and UK applied a containment strategy. Measures were focused on limit-
ing transmission of the virus or delaying the spread in order to gain time to apply effective
response measures. This strategy included laboratory confirmation of suspected cases, contact
tracing and isolation of cases [27–30]. Further, all included countries recommended antiviral
therapy within 48 hours after onset of symptoms [27–31] and requested persons with symp-
toms to be isolated at home or in hospital (depending on their clinical condition) for at least
seven days [27–30, 32].
Widespread viral activity within the country, led UK to move from containment to treat-
ment phase on 2nd July 2009. Laboratory testing was no longer required for all cases and case-
tracing was stopped. Further, antiviral treatment was only offered to clinical cases [33]. To
relieve some of the pressures on the health system, the National Pandemic Flu Service was
launched in England on 23rd July. This was an online and telephone self-care service that
allowed people outside the “at-risk” groups to be assessed for pandemic flu, and if required, to
get access to antiviral treatment without the need to consult a physician [33].
Denmark moved to a mitigation strategy on 7th July. The focus was on preventive treatment
of persons at risk. Only risk group patients or persons with close contact to a risk group patient
needed to be swabbed. Further, antiviral treatment was administered to risk group persons
only, and prophylactic antiviral treatment was given to contacts of laboratory-confirmed cases
only if the contact belonged to a risk group. This included persons with chronic pulmonary
conditions, cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, immunodeficiency, HIV-Infection and pregnant
women (2nd and 3rd Trimester). Furthermore, it was recommended that pregnant women in
their 1st trimester, children< 5 years and severely obese patients should be closely monitored
[34, 35].
On 27th July, Spain officially moved from containment to mitigation, although response
measures had already changed towards mitigation in late June, i.e. contact tracing was ceased.
Case-based reporting in the community was stopped, and antivirals were only given to cases
requiring hospitalization and to those at risk of complications [36, 37].
From early August 2009, Germany applied a mitigation strategy, which predominantly
focused on risk groups. In this strategy, contact-tracing was stopped. Isolation was recom-
mended for cases with contact to vulnerable persons only. Antivirals were only given to cases
in at-risk groups with signs of developing severe illness and case-based reporting requirements
were relaxed [27].
Czech Republic started with a mitigation strategy on 9th July [38]. Further details of the
strategy could not be retrieved.
Vaccination
In late September 2009 (week 40), the European Commission granted approval for two influ-
enza A H1N1 vaccines, Focetria1 (Novartis) and Pandemrix1 (GlaxoSmithKline), in all EU
Member States as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway [39]. The third vaccine for influ-
enza A H1N1, Celvapan1 (Baxter), was approved in early October 2009 [40]. All five study
countries implemented a vaccination program around the time of the second wave (starting
The Pandemic Public Health Paradox
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between week 40 to 44; week 48 in CZ) [Table 2] [4, 41–45] initially focusing on priority groups
which in many cases was extended to the general public.
Media attention
In all researched countries media attention, defined as the number of published news reports
on influenza A H1N1, was highest in week 18 [Table 2], when the WHO declared pandemic
phase 4 and shortly thereafter, pandemic phase 5. Media attention rapidly waned in all coun-
tries and was followed only by smaller peaks in news coverage over the remaining course of the
pandemic Figs 1–5. Media attention curves differed among countries.
Germany: News reporting showed a small surge in media attention in week 24 coinciding
with the WHO’s official pandemic declaration, and another peak in week 30 contemporaneous
with the first wave of influenza A H1N1 transmission. The start of a third surge in attention
corresponded with the official German definition of vaccine priority groups; its peak in week
43–45 paralleled with the start of the mass vaccination program.
United Kingdom: In week 28, after the first and largest wave of transmission, a second surge
in media attention began peaking in week 30. Other smaller peaks coincide with the introduc-
tion of pandemic control measures (mitigation strategy; introduction of vaccination).
Denmark: After the first large peak in media attention, three smaller peaks could be
observed. The first occurred in week 31–32 concurrent with the first wave of transmission, the
second in week 37 following the first fatality abroad from Danish origin, and the third coincid-
ing with the first national fatal case and the start of the mass vaccination program.
Spain: Following the initial peak, media attention was substantially lower over the remain-
ing pandemic course than in the other countries. A smaller surge in media attention, coinciding
with the agreement of priority groups for vaccination, began in week 33, peaking during weeks
35 to 36. It is notable that the peak began the week before the agreement, and ceased at approx-
imately the time of agreement. In week 45 another peak emerged, which corresponded with a
second wave in influenza A H1N1 transmission and the start of the national vaccination
campaign.
Czech Republic: Media attention remained low until week 42, when two contiguous media
attention peaks emerged. The first one, peaking in week 45, coincided with the first fatal case
although not entirely triggered by it. The second one, peaking in week 48, corresponded with
the start of the national mass vaccination program.
During the second wave of the epidemic, when most influenza-related deaths occurred, rela-
tively little media attention was seen in all five study countries.
Risk perception and vaccination uptake
In late November 2009, the Gallup Organization conducted a survey named Flash Eurobarom-
eter in 30 European countries to assess public opinion about influenza and pandemic influenza
A H1N1. In this survey, 69% of the German (N = 1001), 61% of the Czech (N = 1002), 58% of
the Danish (N = 1008), and 49% of the UK participants (N = 1000) believed it was not at all
likely or rather unlikely that they would personally catch the A/H1N1 influenza. The majority
of the participants from ES (66%), DE (62%) and DK (60%) also stated that is was not likely or
not at all likely that they would get vaccinated against the pandemic A/H1N1 virus. This pro-
portion was considerably lower in the UK (37% of the participants) and the CZ (47% of the
Czech interviewees) [Table 2] [25].
For the included countries, the vaccination coverage of persons with underlying diseases as
well as the overall uptake, if available [4], is shown in the green hexagon in Figs 1–5.
The Pandemic Public Health Paradox
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In the UK, the vaccine uptake in clinical risk groups was assessed using data collected from
a sentinel group of GP practices in England. The vaccination uptake among the “under 65”
clinical risk groups is reflected in the green curve in Fig 2. In this group as well as in the over 65
years age group (curve not shown), the vaccine uptake increased steadily until week 4/2010.
Overall, the national vaccine uptake in patients in clinical risk groups aged under 65 years was
35.4%, this included pregnant women. It was 40.4% in those aged 65 years and over. Another
survey assessed the vaccine uptake among healthcare workers in all 389 NHS Trusts in England
on a weekly basis from 8th November 2009 to 4th April 2010. The vaccine uptake among
healthcare workers increased sharply in the first weeks after the vaccine was available and lev-
eled out at approximately 40% from week 4 of 2010 [46].
For DK, the green curve in Fig 5 shows the number of vaccines administered per week during
the pandemic. In week 45, when the vaccination program for people at risk started, 31,530 doses
were administered. For people at risk> 65 years the vaccination began in week 49 and 50, the
vaccine doses administered increased sharply to 318,820 doses before leveling out thereafter.
The pandemic influenza A H1N1 vaccine uptake during the vaccination campaign in DE
was monitored using 13 bi-weekly telephone-surveys between November 2009 and April 2010.
Among the survey participants (approximately 1,000 households per survey), the vaccination
coverage in persons 14 years of age was 4.6% in week 47, 6% in week 49, 7.3% to 7.9% until
week 6 and reached 10.1% in week 10 in 2010 [47].
The overall and group-specific vaccination coverage cannot be compared between the coun-
tries due to methodological differences in its assessment. Nonetheless, the trends in vaccine
uptake over time indicate similarities in UK, DK and DE.
The vaccine uptake throughout the pandemic could not be illustrated for CZ and ES since
data could not be obtained for these two countries.
Discussion
The combined analysis of the elements described above, confirms that media logic does not
equate to epidemiological logic, which adds to prior—yet mixed—findings that influenza rates
oftentimes diverge from (social) media patterns (e.g., Mollema et al., 2015; Fenichel et al., 2013;
Signorini et al. 2011) [5–7]. In the case of the 2009 influenza A H1N1, media attention did not
increase with increased number of infections or casualties but rather spotlighted certain key
events based on their news value. This pattern was consistently found across all five European
countries, indicating its generality beyond national media systems and cultures. Media atten-
tion surged with the WHO declarations of a pandemic (in week 18), before the pandemic
started to spread across European countries, and dropped to lower levels after this first peak.
Later on, the media did respond to news worthy real world events such as the introduction of
the vaccine and the first nationally reported death (in most but not all countries), however
media patterns show little concurrence with the number of cases and the number of confirmed
deaths across countries [Table 2].
Google Flu Trends analysis of influenza-related web search queries in Germany and Spain
showed that, in comparison, search activity for influenza-like disease increased significantly
later in the course of the pandemic and reflected the actual epidemic curve peaks in Germany
and Spain fairly well. This indicates that public interest in influenza related information
increased with rising influenza cases in the own country [48]. Since there is a reporting lag of
only one day and the search queries can be analyzed quickly, this may be a valuable informa-
tion source for an up-to-date disease activity trend [49].
Although we cannot draw definitive conclusions regarding causal patterns, the finding that
the media curves declined long before the epidemiological curves, paired with the established
The Pandemic Public Health Paradox
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knowledge that the sheer amount of news reports can contribute to the social amplification or
attenuation of risk [16–20], could be one of the potential reasons for the rather low risk percep-
tion of citizens with respect to influenza A H1N1 and vaccination uptake across countries.
Apart from sheer media attention, media content may also play a role in explaining the pan-
demic public health paradox [50]. For example in Germany there was a period of media dis-
courses questioning the safety of the vaccine and the availability of a different vaccine for the
military and government officials in contrast to the general population was high on the media
agenda. Media attention to barriers for vaccination, such as vaccine safety, may have had nega-
tive impact on public perception of the vaccine and vaccination rates.
Apart from the content, the magnitude of attention, an issue arouses in influenced by the
frequency with which this issue is communicated and repeated in different media sources. A
time-series analysis of 36 telephone surveys in the UK revealed that the level of worry of con-
tracting swine-flu (which was quite low (9.6% to 32.9%)) was associated with the volume of
media messages during the first summer wave of the epidemic in the UK but not prior to com-
munity transmission in the UK or during the autumn/winter wave. The study also showed that
a level of higher worry of oneself of one’s child getting infected was associated with a higher
vaccine acceptance. The authors conclude that when levels of worry are generally low, a rise in
the frequency of media messages could increase the public’s perception in the effectiveness and
therefore the uptake of protective behavior [51]. In our study, the media attention was lower in
all five countries when sustained in-country transmission was going on compared to the early
phase. This paired with lower levels of worry is likely to reduce vaccine uptake.’
Utmost care was taken to use comparable data sources for the five study countries and to
transparently describe where the data was retrieved from and which data was not available. We
feel that even if the choice of data sources may have some effect on the comparability in terms
of absolute numbers, the trend captured is comparable.
The observed divergence of media attention and disease epidemiology poses a challenge for
countries in such an epidemic situation. Firstly, it is very unlikely, that sufficient information
about a new virus or an unusual strain of a virus, its potential spread and the disease’s severity
is known early in a pandemic. At this stage generally only likely projections can be made about
the course of the pandemic and containment measures initiated, but this is the period when the
media’s spotlight is on and the issue is highest on the public agenda [19].
Using the initial media attention peak in week 18 of 2009 to inform the population about
the virus, the potential spread in the country, as well as recommended preventive and curative
measures was rather difficult with missing facts. Media spotlights, even if preceding events in
the own country, offer windows of opportunity to inform the public about resources where
they can seek reliable information when it becomes available and when public interest rises.
One can thus establish a channel for communication that remains even after the media spot-
light has moved on to other issues. This is very important considering that media follows dif-
ferent logic, hence it can be expected that coverage of epidemiological facts with lower news
values but high importance for public health will only be limited.
Our analysis further shows that the main vaccination uptake across countries occurred
within a short period of around four weeks after the start of vaccination. This short time-span
could likewise be regarded as a window of opportunity. Concerted efforts should be undertaken
to avoid a “pandemic public health paradox” in future epidemic situations. These efforts should
be made by state ministries, public health institutes and especially by health professionals, who
are regarded as the most trusted source of information, according to the Eurobarometer survey
[25]. Public health officials need to be aware of the different media logic and the short periods
of media spotlights and use them appropriately in order to provide the right information to
their audience at the right time.
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